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Summary findings
The decollectivization  of agriculture in Vietnam was a  based privatization. The authors find that 95-99 percent
crucial step in the country's transition to a market  of maximum  aggregate consumption (depending on the
economy. But the assignment  of land use rights had to be  region) was realized by a land allocation that reduced
decentralized,  and local cadres ostensibly  had the power  overall inequality,  with the poorest absolutely  better off.
to corrupt this process.  They attribute this outcome to initial conditions at the
Ravallion and van de Walle assess  the realized  land  time of reform and actions by the center to curtail the
allocation against explicit counterfactuals, including  the  power of local elites.
simulated allocation implied  by a competitive market-
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Vietnam's land reform of 1988 abandoned the collective farming system that had been
introduced in the 1960s. The 1988 Land Law and its key implementation directive-"Resolution
10"-gave  individual households long-term use rights over the collectives' land and other
resources. 2 Four million hectares of land were thus scheduled for effective privatization. The
economic significance of this new land law is obvious, given that (around 1990) three-quarters of
the country's workforce depended directly on farming. Clearly, this land privatization was
hugely important to living standards and their distribution in Vietnam.
Implementation of Resolution 10 was decentralized to commune level; there was little
choice, since the center could not control the local authorities, who were (naturally) much better
informed about local conditions. So the center faced an accountability problem in this
decentralized reform. 3 Malarney (1997, p.900) describes the problem faced by the reformers:
5..given the institutional dominance of the Communist Party, local politicians with party
backgrounds, which is to say all, are compelled by the party to be impartial and
committed to official policies; yet, as politicians drawn from local kin and community,
they are also pressured to nurture interpersonal  relations, selectively avoid official
dictates, and use their positions to bring advantages to kin and/or co-residents."
This echoes concerns in recent literature and policy discussion about decentralized development
programs (Bardhan and Mookherjee, 2000; Galasso and Ravallion, 2001). In developing country
settings, the center often faces high costs of acquiring the information needed to control
outcomes locally, and local agents may well have little sympathy with the center's aims. So there
is a real risk that a decentralized program will be captured by a local elite that sees the
intervention as an opportunity to enhance its own position.
2  What  is widely  known  as the 1988  Land  Law, was  in actual  fact enacted  December  29 1987. We
will follow  the convention  of calling  it the 1988  Land  Law.  Resolution  10 followed  in April 1988.
3  Local accountability  problems  were apparently  also common  in the 1960s'  collectivization
program  (Fforde,  1989)
2This paper assesses the assignment of land-use rights achieved by Vietnam's de-
collectivization. We use two counter-factuals for assessing impact. One is an equal allocation of
(quality-adjusted) land and the other is the allocation that would have maximized aggregate
consumption, as would have been achieved by a competitive market-based privatization under
ideal conditions. Comparing this with the actual allocation allows us to estimate the implicit
value that was placed on efficiency versus distributional goals in the allocation of land. We also
characterize the specific distributional outcomes of the realized land allocation; possibly
efficiency was sacrificed, but the poor would have been better off if it had not been.
The following section describes Vietnam's de-collectivization, and the factors leading up
to it. Section 3 outlines our approach in theory, while section 4 describes our empirical
specification. Section 5 discusses our survey data, collected 2-3 years after the reform was
completed. Section 6 presents the regressions and section 7 discusses their welfare implications.
Section 8 concludes.
2.  Privatizing  the collective's  land
With the aim of raising agricultural productivity, Vietnam's  1988 Land Law and
Resolution 10 abandoned collective farming and granted households long-term use rights over
land and the freedom to cultivate it as they wished. 4 Land remained the property of the State,
reverting back to the authorities when a household moved or stopped farming. 5 The de-
collectivization was virtually complete by 1990 (Ngo 1993).
4  Use  rights for crop land  were granted  for 10  to 15 years;  longer  periods  applied  to tree crops.
Some  flexibility  was allowed  in that 10-15%  of the cooperative's  land could  be kept  aside  for new
households  and demobilized  soldiers,  and available  for hire  by households  in the meantime  (Tran 1997).
5  Although  Resolution  10 affirms  the right to transfer  land  use and legate  it to one's offspring,  such
rights were  not fully  guaranteed  legally  (Bloch  and Oesterberg  1989).  It did not recognize  the right  to
exchange,  lease,  or mortgage  land. These  rights were only extended  in the 1993  Land  Law. Land  policies
have  evolved  since,  but it is the impact  of the 1988  Land  Laws that is our main interest  in this paper.
3The new Land Law made recommendations on how the land was to be allocated across
households. It recommended that allocations take account of the availability of land resources,
on households' labor force and the land that households had been cultivating. It also placed
certain limits on how much land could go to any one household. 6 Resolution 10 acknowledges
claims to the land farmed prior to collectivization. It also entreats the cooperatives to provide
appropriate  jobs and good arable land to the families of war heroes and martyrs, to those who
significantly contributed to the revolution, to the injured and unable-bodied and to others facing
considerable difficulties. But it then dilutes this request by adding that the well-being of these
groups is really the responsibility of the local Peoples' Committees and that the Ministry of
Labor, War Invalids and Social Affairs and the Ministry of Finance will devise policies on social
assistance to them (Vietnam Communist Party 1988).
While the new land law extended some guidelines, it left local cadres with considerable
power over land allocation and the conditions of contracts. The center's directives were
disseminated by Provincial Peoples' Committees, who in turn relied on the local authorities,
apparently allowing them wide berth in adapting the guidelines to local conditions, priorities and
customs. One can expect foot dragging on their part, and the pursuance of quite different
objectives in implementing  the central directives. Those who were making the decisions locally
were essentially the same cadres who had positions of relative privilege as the managers of the
cooperatives, and relatively high living standards under the collective mode of agricultural
production (Selden, 1993). The reform threatened to undermine their power and privilege.
6  Article  27 of the 1988  Land  Law stipulates  that the land allocation  to each  household  should  not
exceed  ten percent  of the total farm  land  area of each  concemed  village. It further  decrees  regional  per
capita  land  ceilings  for those contracting  land for long term  use from  state operated  farms. It has  been
claimed  that ceilings  were officially  set at two hectares  in the fertile  but densely  populated  Red River
Delta  and three  hectares  in the South  (ANZDEC  2000),  though  we find no mention  of this in Resolution
10  or the 1988  Land  Law.
4So there was a real risk here that the benefits of reform would be captured by self-
interested local cadres, potentially undermining the center's aims. There is anecdotal evidence
of abuse of local power, against the center's interests. Kolko (1997, p. 92) argues that:
"From its inception, the land redistribution was marred by conflict, ambiguity and
corruption. Cadres in many villages immediately began to distribute the best land to their
families and relatives, and abuse was rife."
There were numerous public disputes at the time, stemming from (amongst other things)
conflicting historical claims over land, disputes over village and commune boundaries and
complaints about corrupt party cadres (Nguyen 1992; Pingali and Xuan 1992; Kolko 1997). It
has also been argued that those with the weakest prior claims on plots did poorly in the land
allocation. For example, Ngo (1993) argues that war veterans, demobilized soldiers and their
families were short-changed in the land allocations and were over-represented as protagonists in
disputes.
It is unimaginable that such an enormous land reform was free from corruption. However,
the interpretation of the existing qualitative evidence on this issue is unclear. Cases of extreme
abuse of power by local elites were visible when they boiled up in local protests-Vietnam's
"hot spots" (Kolko 1997, cites many examples). However, the fact that local protests were
possible can also be interpreted as evidence that there were constraints on local abuse of power.
The possibility for bias in the historical-qualitative account is clear; the cases of abuse
may well have been uncommon but far more visible. Objective village-level assessments were
rare; in the only village study we know of to address this issue, Tanaka (2001) describes the
elaborate efforts of the "land allocation committee" in a North Vietnamese village to equalize
land allocation. Such efforts are unlikely to have attracted much publicity at the time.  While one
would not want to generalize from one village study, it is no less hazardous to infer from the
available evidence that capture by local elites was the norm.
5There clearly were constraints on the power of the cadres, in part due to actions by the
center. Formally, Article 54 of the Land Law extends the threat of punishment for officials found
to have abused their power in the allocation process.  Enforcement is, of course, another matter.
However, it is important to note that Vietnam's peasants had sacrificed heavily through long
periods of war, in the hope of a better life after reunification. The outcomes for their living
standards had been disappointing. Peasant resistance to the collective system was common in the
1980s, and has been identified as a factor motivating the center's de-collectivization reforms
(Beresford 1985, 1993; Selden, 1993; Kerkvliet 1995). With the center's support, the Vietnam
Peasant Union (VPU) was created in 1988 with the explicit aim of giving peasants a stronger
voice in reform policies and-implicitly  at least-promoting  the center's reforms locally. As
with past peasant unions, it seems that the VPU was eventually captured by local elites; Wurfel
(1993, p.32) argues that by 1990 the VPU had been "tamed by local party cadre, who had
interests to protect." But for a critical period the VPU appears to have acted as a counter-weight
to the cadres (Wurfel, 1993). During the reform period, the center also gave greater freedom to
the press; the press subsequently carried much criticism of the bureaucracy, again helping the
reform process (Wurfel 1993).
The reform movement was clearly driven by more than the center's concerns about the
welfare of peasants. The same inefficiencies of the collective farming system constrained the
resources available to the center for its industrialization plans, and created food shortages in
urban areas (Beresford 1993; Kerkvliet 1995). Arguably then, the reforms were only possible
through an implicit coalition between the peasants and reformers at the center-a  coalition that
clearly aimed to constrain the power of local cadres to capture the process.
Recent history provided a reference point in deciding how the land should be allocated.
6Collectivization came soon after the completion of land reform programs that had gone a long
way toward redressing the high inequality of land ownership under French Colonial rule
(Beresford 1985; Pingali and Xuan 1992). The pre-collectivization allocation may have
influenced land allocation at de-collectivization. There are reports that some households simply
went back to farming the land they had originally handed over to the cooperative or collective, or
land they had some historical claim to.7 While there was no legal commitment to restore the pre-
collectivization land allocation, that was an option for the local authorities.
There were important differences between the North and the South at the time of the
reforn.  In the South's Mekong Delta, farmers had resisted collectivization, and by the time
Resolution 10 was introduced less than 10 percent of all the region's farmers had been organized
into collectives. In contrast, virtually all of the crop land in the North and in the South's Central
Coastal provinces-where  joining the collectives was seen as a means of rebuilding after the
war-was  collectivized by the time of the reform (Pingali and Xuan 1992; Ngo 1993). Southern
Vietnamese farm households who participated did so for a much shorter period, while many
never participated in the collectives, notably in the Mekong Delta. However, the land allocation
in the South was still administratively determined and periodically re-allocated (Pingali and
Xuan 1992); the difference with the more collectivized North is that in the South (especially the
Mekong Delta) farmers continued to farm individually rather than collectively. Prior to
reunification, agricultural land in the South had also undergone a series of land reforms. 8
Resolution 10 allowed farmers in the South to recover land owned prior to 1975, though former
7  Smith  and Binh (1994)  quote  a number  of Son La  households  in the North as professing,  in 1994,
to be farning the same  land  they  had at the  time of the departure  of the French.  Tran (1997)  claims  that
land  was  redistributed  according  to household  original  contributions  to the cooperatives  in some  areas.
8  The South's  land  reform  programs  prior to reunification  had initially  consisted  of lease  price
control  and ownership  ceilings,  but were followed  in 1970  by substantial  land  redistribution  and titling
under a "land-to-the  tiller"  program  (Callison  1983;  Pingali  and Xuan 1992).
7"landlords" were explicitly barred from doing so (Pingali and Xuan 1992). There are reports that
in the Mekong Delta the implementation of Resolution 10 often entailed restoring the land
allocation that prevailed prior to reunification (Hayami, 1993; ANZDEC, 2000).
The collectives had also owned and controlled the farm capital stock (tools, machinery,
draft animals) that also had to be allocated among farm households. It is sometimes claimed that
this process more easily allowed cooperative officials to favor themselves, their families and
friends than the more visible land allocation process. Because of data limitations we can only
focus on land allocation, though we will look for signs of differing returns to land associated
with political connections.
3.  Theoretical  model of the actual and counter-factual  land allocations
Motivated by the above observations we shall test whether the local implementation of
decollectivization served distributional goals-possibly  reflecting capture by local elites-at
some loss to aggregate consumption. We construct a model that allows us to estimate that loss,
and to compare the observed allocation against explicit counter-factuals. One of those will be an
equal allocation of land per capita. This is easily calculated. The other is the allocation that
maximizes aggregate consumption of the commune; this requires a model of consumption.
The actual decision-making process might be anything from administrative fiat
(according to the cadre's personal preferences) to a complex bargaining game. We only assume
that the outcome (however it is reached) is Pareto optimal, in that no commune member's utility
can be increased without someone else being worse off. To characterize all possible solutions,
we represent the problem as maximizing a weighted sum of welfare levels across all farm-
households. The Pareto weight attached to the utility of household i is wi = w(Xi) where Xis a
vector of exogenous household characteristics. Naturally, different weighting functions imply
8different distributions of land and utility. If the weights tend to be negatively (positively)
correlated with welfare (to be defined) then one can say that the outcome will tend to be "pro-
poor" ("pro-rich").
The utility of the i'th farm-household is assumed to depend solely on its consumption of a
composite commodity. The household receives Li of land, which yields an output of F(Li, Xi ).
(For now we treat land as homogeneous; in the empirical work we allow for observable
heterogeneity, and we consider the consequences of latent heterogeneity in the next section.) The
household also has (positive or negative) non-farm income, Y(X,)  .9 (At the time of the reform,
and since, agricultural labor markets were virtually non-existent in Vietnam, so to simplify the
exposition we close off this market in our model.) The household's consumption is then:
Ci  = C(Li,  Xi)  = F(Li,  XI)  + Y(X,)  (1)
We assume that the function F is increasing and strictly concave in L. Utility is in turn an
increasing concave function of consumption, Ui = U(C,).
The commune selects an allocation of the total available land nL  across n households,
with mean L.  The observed land allocation is:
(L1,..,LL,) = arg max[I  w(Xi)U[F(Li,  Xi)  + Y(Xi)]  ELi  = nL]  (2)
i=l  i=1
which solves:
w(X,)U'(Ci)FL  (L, Xi) = ,u for  i = 1,..,  n  (3)
where FL (Li, Xi)  is the marginal product of land and ,u is the shadow price of land in the
9  The functions F and Y  may vary between households in different communes. We will deal with
this possibility in the empirical work by including a complete set of commune effects in the regressions.
9commune (the Lagrange multiplier on the aggregate  land constraint in equation 2). It is readily
verified that the land allocation is strictly increasing (decreasing) in X.  (thej'th  element of the
vector Xi)  if the sum of the elasticities of  w(X;)  and U'(Ci)FL  (Li,Xi)  to X,  is positive
(negative).
Compare this to the allocation that maximizes the commune's aggregate consumption:
(4L*,..,)  = arg max[  C(Li, Xi)  n Li = nL]  (4)
i=l  i=l
We call this the "consumption-efficient allocation." This equates  CL (La,  Xi)  = FL (L', Xi)  with
the multiplier 2  on aggregate land in (4), giving
L' =L(Xi, A) for i=l,  ..,n  (5)
Mean consumption is then:
n
G  =  X C(L , Xi)/n  (6)
i=1
The consumption loss from the actual allocation is then C  - C where C is the actual mean.
The consumption-efficient allocation is also the competitive equilibrium given
(X, ,.., XJ).  In a market-based land allocation, each household's consumption will be
F(Li, Xi) + Y(Xi)  - AL; where A is the market price of land. Demands equate FL  (Li, Xi)  =A
over all i, which is the allocation that maximizes aggregate consumption under the non-market
allocation. Naturally the market solution will also vary with the joint distribution of the Xs.
There are some caveats to this interpretation of the consumption efficient allocation. A
competitive market is unlikely to have been a feasible option at the time in Vietnam. For one
thing, agricultural land markets were virtually non-existent. And other markets (notably for
credit) and institutions (for property rights enforcement) were probably not functioning well
10enough to assure an efficient market-based privatization of land. However, against these
observations, it should also be noted that under communism very little mobility had been
allowed between communes. People may well have been sufficiently well inforrned within each
village to know if one family attached an appreciably higher value to extra land than another,
even though a market did not exist.
It should also be noted that if holding land gives utility independently of consumption
then the competitive market allocation of land will differ from the consumption-maximizing one.
For example, if land provides insurance against risk then it will have value independently of
current consumption. Then our interpretation of the consumption-maximizing  allocation as the
market solution would also require that risk markets worked perfectly.'0 Since we have no basis
for assigning a value to land independently of the current consumption it generates we cannot
calculate a "conditional" market solution (conditional on other market failures). Nonetheless, the
consumption-maximizing  allocation remains a natural benchmark for assessing the realized
allocation. It will be of interest to see how close the non-market allocation is to this benchmark.
4.  Empirical  model
In our empirical implementation of the above model we make the following assumptions:
Assumption 1: Utility is given by log consumption:
U(Ci ) = In  C(Li, Xi)  (7)
Assumption 2: Log consumption is given by:
lnCi  = a +f,lnLi  + Xir  +  si  (8)
where 0 < 8 <  1 and ci is a zero-mean i.i.d. error term uncorrelated with ln Li and Xi .
10  To give  another  example,  Burgess  (2000)  argues  that food market  failures  exist  in rural China
such  that holding  more  land  reduces  the shadow  price of food.
11Assumption 3: The welfare weights take the form:
In  wi =Xb +  vi  (9)
where vi is a zero-mean error term uncorrelated with Xi.
Assumptions 1-3 imply that the land allocation satisfying equation (4) can be written in
explicit form as the regression model:" 
ln Li = ln(,8 /,u)  + Xib  + vi  (10)
This identifies directly the parameters of the implicit welfare weights of the local land-allocation
authority. Substituting (10) into (8) generates the reduced form equation for consumption:
ln Ci  = a + ,  ln(i  / pt) + Xi (,ib +  Y) +  8i  +/3v 1 (11)
The consumption-maximizing  allocation by contrast is given by:12
InL  1  =a  +  ,lS  +  i  (12)
Comparing (10) and (12), it can be seen that if y /(1 - ,B)  = b then the actual allocation responds
to changes in Xthe  same way as the consumption-efficient allocation. So if the two allocations
are essentially the same then we should be able to accept the restriction that b = fib  + y  when
imposed on the reduced form equations, (1  0) and (11). If we cannot accept this restriction then it
is of interest to calculate the consumption-efficient land allocation, (L, ,  ,..., Ln ),  from which
we can then measure the distribution of consumption losses implied by the actual allocation,
using the fact that the proportionate consumption loss for household i is (L*  / Lj  )  - 1.
To verify  the following  equation,  take logs  through  (3) and note that note  that (7) and (8) imply
that U'(.)FL = 8 / Li.  Equation  (10)  then follows  using (9).
12  Given (8),  the consumption-efficient  allocation  to household  i solves ln  L,  = ln(,B  / A) + In C
where  lnC, = a +  Iln Li + Xiy  +.
12While allocated land is endogenous in this model, it is taken to be exogenous to
consumption (i.e., Cov( v, s )=O).  This is a standard assumption in past empirical work for
Vietnam and in other settings in which land allocation is done administratively rather than
through markets.'3 The assumption can also be defended on the grounds that the land allocation
preceded the survey-based consumption measure by 3-4 years.
Our estimates of the parameters of equation (8) will be biased if there are omitted
variables that jointly influence the welfare weights and consumption levels. The most serious
concern in this respect is heterogeneity in land quality.  Higher land quality will probably result
in higher consumption at given land quantity. Assuming that the quality differences are public
knowledge within the commune, the administrative land allocation will take them into account,
with more land being used to compensate for lower quality. We will include available controls
for differences in the average quality of land holdings. However, latent heterogeneity will create
a negative correlation between the error terms in the estimated consumption equation and the
land allocation equation (Cov( v, e )<O).
Notice that our test for systematic differences between the efficient and actual land
allocations is robust to heterogeneity in land quality. Our test is based on the reduced form
coefficients in (10) and (1  1); it does not require the (potentially biased) parameters of (8).
Nonetheless, our estimates of the parameters of the implicit equation for the efficient allocation
(equation 12) do require the parameters of the structural model in (8).  So bias due to latent
heterogeneity in land quality will contaminate our estimates of the efficient allocation.
In principle this could be dealt with by introducing an instrumental variable that
13  See for example  Wiens  (1998)  and van de Walle  (1998).  The assumption  is also a standard  one in
empirical  work  for China,  where a large  share  of crop land  is also allocated  administratively;  see for
example,  Burgess  (2000)  and Jalan  and Ravallion  (2001).
13influences land allocation but not consumption conditional on land, i.e., at least one element of
the parameter vector b in (9) would have to be set to zero, while leaving the corresponding
element of y unrestricted. However, there is no theoretical basis for such an exclusion
restriction; anything that can be included from our data set could presumably have been observed
or anticipated  by the local authorities.
It should also be noted that while there is likely to be heterogeneity in land quality across
plots within communes, the scope for land fragmentation - combining land from different plots
when forming a package for each household - means that the variance across households in the
average quality of their allocations can be considerably less than the underlying inter-plot
variance. In the only evidence on this point that we know of, Tanaka (2001) finds that plot
fragmentation in North Vietnamese villages was used to produce land parcels of relatively even
quality. Then heterogeneity in land quality would not be a problem for our analysis.
5.  Data
Our data are from the Vietnam Living Standards Survey (VNLSS) of 1992/93. This is
one of the national, multi-purpose, surveys sponsored by the World Bank under the Living
Standards Measurement Study (LSMS).1 4 The VNLSS follows established LSMS practices
(World Bank 1995). Our sample is the 2810 rural farning households in the VNLSS with
complete data. Some 400 households had to be dropped due to missing data on key variables.
There are also 419 households in the rural farmning  sample without any allocated irrigated or non-
irrigated agricultural land identified in the survey. Our reading of the literature and casual
observations suggest that it is unlikely that there is genuine censoring, such that some farming
14  The VLNS  is public  access,  subject  to standard  conditions.  For further  information  on the  LSMS
see http://www.worIdbank.org/lsms/.
14households were deliberately left out of the land privatization. Under that assumption, we focus
solely on the sample of farrning  households with complete data.
Table 1 gives summary statistics on the variables we will use from the data set, by region.
Household consumption includes the value of consumption from own production, imputed
expenditures on housing and the depreciated value of consumer durables. It is deflated by a
monthly price index to allow for temporal variation in household interviews and by a spatial
price index to take account of regional price variation (World Bank, 1995).
Geographic heterogeneity across communes is to be expected, if only because of
differences in the shadow price of land (,u in equation 10). While the sample size does not
permit estimation of a separate model for each commune, all regressions included a complete set
of commune dummy variables. And all parameters are allowed to vary regionally. Vietnam is
routinely divided into seven regions reflecting geographical and historical similarities. We
conduct the analysis both nationally and separately for the Northern Uplands (NU), Red River
(RR), North Coast (NC), Central Coast (CC) and Mekong Delta (MD) regions.'5
Within annual crop-land, the survey identifies five land types: (i) Allocated land: This is
the land allocated to households by the cooperative or productive group under Resolution 10; this
accounts for the bulk of the North's crop land; (ii) Long term use land: Predominant in the South,
this differs from allocated land only in that the farner owes no contracted output (in addition to
obligatory taxes for all allocated land) to the cooperative or productive group that allocated  the
land; (iii) Auctioned land: This refers to a part of the cooperatives' land reserved for bidding  by
households,  with a three to five year tenure depending on the region; (iv) Private land: This
15  In the Central  Highlands  region,  land  is mostly  perennial.  In the South  East  there  were too few
observations  in the sample;  after  excluding  non-farming  households  and those with missing  data we are
left with  a sample  of only 99 observations  in the South  East.
15consists of land inherited and used by households as a garden area, as well as an area equal to 5%
of the commune's agricultural land that has been handed to households for their private use. This
land requires no payment; and (v) Sharecropped  or rented land.
What we refer to here as "allocated land" is annual crop land, either irrigated or
unirrigated, which is defined as either "allocated land" by the survey respondents or "long-term
use land."  This includes all allocated land, including any that is not actually cultivated by the
household.  There is also an allocation mechanism for perennial, forest and water surface land.
However, these other land types followed a much slower and haphazard allocation process so
that we limit our analysis here to allocated annual irrigated and non-irrigated cropland.
We aggregate irrigated and non-irrigated land using region-specific weights to obtain
irrigated land equivalents. To calculate the weights, we estimated region-specific regressions of
farm profit on total irrigated and non-irrigated annual crop land, perennial, forest and other land
amounts (including swidden, bald hill and newly cleared land), and commune effects.  1 6 Controls
were also included for household characteristics (the head's religion, ethnicity, age and age
squared and whether born locally; household size, the share of male adults in the household, the
years of primary schooling of the head and of other adults and a dummy for whether the
household is a social subsidy beneficiary). The ratio of the coefficients on non-irrigated to that
on irrigated land was then used as the weight on non-irrigated land to recalculate an allocated
irrigated land equivalent quantity for each household. The weights seemed plausible. 17
16  We exclude  water  surface  land  from  the farm  profits  regressions  because  we are unable  to
adequately  calculate  net profits from  water  surface  land.  The questionnaire  does  not allow  a separation  of
expenses  incurred  in raising  water  products  from  that of raising  livestock,  and assumptions  must also be
made  about  consumption  from own  production.
17  Our  estimated  weights  for non-irrigated  land  are 0.739  for the national  sample,  0.241  for the
Northem  Uplands,  0.407  for the Red River,  0.495  for the North Coast,  0.838  for the Central  Coast  and
0.906  for the Mekong  Delta.  On  the measure  of farm  profit  see van de Walle  (1998).
16The survey asked respondents to assign their total annual crop land into the categories
"good," "medium" and "poor" quality. Unfortunately, the questionnaire design does not allowr  us
to separately identify quality for allocated land versus other land types.  So we cannot use these
quality assessments in calculating our measure of allocated irrigated land equivalents. These
quality assessments are problematic from other points of view. The categories are probably quite
well-defined within communes, but are unlikely to be comparable between communes. Nor can
it be assumed that they would account fully for omitted heterogeneity in land quality in our main
results. The exogeneity of these land quality variables is also questionable. Against these
considerations, excluding these variables adds to the aforementioned concerns about omitted
heterogeneity in land quality.  So we chose to include each household's proportions of good
irrigated and non-irrigated land in the consumption and land allocation regressions, as controls
for quality.'8 We also tested robustness to dropping these variables.
We treat private land in a special way. As can be seen in Table 1, land classified as private
is not negligible and falls under all usages. The category is clearly broader than residential or
garden area. This type of land has typically been with the household for a long time and the
amounts of this land were clearly known at land allocation time.  So it is reasonable to treat the
amounts of this type of land as exogenous explanatory  variables. We treat all other land as
endogenous, so that it does not appear in the model.
Our data were collected five years after the 1988 Land Law (though prior to the 1993
Land Law). In trying to explain the allocations we want to use variables that reflect the situation
around 1988. We have no explicit information on the methods for allocating land use rights in
18  Very few  households  reported  that they  had "bad quality"  irrigated  land or "good  quality"  non-
irrigated  land.  So we  aggregated  the  categories  into two; by "good  quality  non-irrigated  land"  we mean
"good"  or "medium"  quality.
17the communes. As we have noted, Resolution 10 left this quite vague. Some observers mention
that household size was taken into account (Ngo, 1993; Hayami, 1993), while in other cases it
seems that an effort was made to take into account available labor.' 9 Our demographic variables
include household size and the dependency ratio. Household size is that reported in the 1992/93
survey minus all members younger than six years of age. The dependency ratio is one minus the
ratio of labor age members (between 20 and 65 for men and 20 and 60 for women) to all
household members minus those aged less than six years.
We include dummies for the gender of the head, whether he/she was born locally,
whether he/she reports practicing the Christian or Buddhist religions as opposed to no religion,
animism or other and for whether the head of household belongs to an ethnic group other than
the majority Kinh or the relatively well-off Chinese ethnic groups. We include a dummy
variable for whether the household reports cultivating swidden land. This aims to capture a
ethno-cultural particularity of those who practice shifting cultivation. Since at least the sixties,
the government has pursued policies to sedentarize such groups by apportioning land to them
(Bloch and Oesterberg 1989). Resolution 10 also states that practical measures should be adopted
to promote permanent agriculture and settlement. One might therefore expect these households
to get more allocated land as a result.
We also include a dummy variable for whether a household contains a handicapped adult
of labor age. 20 The latter could influence the land allocation decision negatively, through effects
19  For  example,  Tran  (1997)  describes  one local  allocation  rule as giving  a full share  to members  of
working  age (defined  as 16  to 60 for men  and 16 to 55 for  women),  half a share  to those  above  working
age  and in the 13  to 15 age  range,  and one third share  to the youngest. Also see Hayami  (1993).
20  We create  this variable  from those  individuals  21-65  for men and 21-60  for women  who  said they
did not work  during  the last 12  months,  or look for work  in the last 7 days, and gave  being  handicapped  as
the main  reason.  This variable  may  not be measured  well as it may exclude  those who  have  been  cured
since  the land  allocation  time and it may  well include  more  recently  disabled  adults.
18on productivity. Against that, the Vietnamese government has had a number of policies
bestowing preferential treatment to the disabled and those individuals and their families who
suffered in the wars.  A handicapped adult might thus be favored. However, this variable will not
fully capture the possibility that soldiers and their families were treated differently to others as
decreed by Resolution 10 (Vietnam Communist Party 1988) and alleged by Ngo (1993). We test
for this by also adding a dummy variable for whether the household or one of its members is a
recipient of social subsidy transfers from the government. These transfers are targeted to the
disabled, war wounded and the families of war heroes and martyrs. Receipt of this transfer
appears to be the best way to identify such households in our data. There are, however, possible
concerns about the endogeneity of this variable (notably if the nonpoor select out of the
program).  So we did our analysis with and without this variable.
The survey did not identify members of the Communist Party. However, we do know if a
household member worked for the cooperative, a social organization, a State Owned Enterprise
(SOE) or the government for five years or more, either in their primary or secondary jobs. On a
priori  grounds it is unclear how these variables would influence land allocation. On the one
hand, other sources of employment may entail a substitution effect, with the commune allocating
less land to such households. On the other hand, it may well come with a "power effect,"
whereby households with such employment also have more power over local decisions
(interpretable as an effect on the welfare weights in equation 3).
As also noted in section 2, it is possible that the most egregious abuse and corruption
occurred in the distribution of collectively owned farming implements and draft animals rather
than that of land. If so, we would expect to find positive impacts on consumption through the
returns to land for favored households. We will test this by including in the consumption
19equation an interaction effect between land and whether a household member worked for a
cooperative at or prior to de-collectivization. This is an imperfect test as it allows only for
favoritism through household member ties, but this is the best we can do with the data.
6.  Regressions  for consumption  and allocated land
For the sample as a whole and each region, we can convincingly reject the null hypothesis
(with probability less than 0.00005) that the observed land allocation responded the same way to
household characteristics as the consumption-efficient  allocation that one would have expected
from a competitive market-based privatization, under our assumptions. The reduced form
regressions for consumption and test statistics for the hypothesis that the two allocations are the
same can be found in the Appendix.  So we proceeded to estimate the efficient allocation.
Table 2 gives the structural model of consumption (equation 8). The results are generally
unsurprising. Household consumption is a rising function of household size, with an elasticity
less than unity. In most regions consumption is higher for households with a government or
SOE job. It is increased by higher household education. And consumption rises with the amount
of allocated land in all regions.
Table 3 gives the reduced form equation for the actual land allocation (equation 10) and
the estimated parameters of the implied equation for the consumption-efficient allocation
(equation 12). There is diversity between regions in how much the two allocations differ, notably
between the North (the Northern Uplands, the Red River and North Coast) and South (the
Central Coast and Mekong Delta). For example, in the North, the actual allocation is more
responsive to household size than the efficient allocation would have been. This reverses in the
South. The dependency ratio significantly negatively affects the actual allocations in the North
but not in the South (the CC and MD).  The negative coefficient on the dependency ratio
20indicates that the administrative allocation in the North put higher weight on household members
who were of prime working age than the consumption-efficient allocation would have required.
In the North (except the Uplands), being in a minority group significantly increases the
administrative allocation, but decreases the efficient allocation (though only significantly so in
the RR). In the other two regions there is less difference in how ethnicity affected the two
allocations. The positive and significant effect of being a minority household in the northern
regions probably captures the fact that the minorities were given more land as a result of having
contributed more to the collectives originally, as allowed by Resolution 10.
Having a household member with a government job or in a SOE tended to reduce the
administrative allocation, though the effect is generally not significant. But these characteristics
would have resulted in a higher efficient allocation - suggestive of greater access to credit
and/or productive inputs by these households. Again there are some regional differences in these
effects. For example, there is no significant effect of SOE on the efficient allocation in the
South; the significant national effect stems from the NU and RR.
Administrative allocations responded positively to male household headship, and much
more so than the efficient allocation.  Generally, education of the household head had no
significant effect on the actual allocation (the sole exception is in the CC, where higher education
reduced the allocation.) The education of others in the household was also insignificant in the
actual allocation. However, the consumption maximizing allocation would have favored
households with higher education, presumably reflecting complementarities between education
and land productivity. The MD is the one exception.
Receipt of a social subsidy is found to have reduced the actual land allocation nationally,
though this effect was confined solely to the Mekong Delta. This provides some support for the
21claims that war veterans and their families were unequally treated in the land allocation process
in the South. In contrast, we found this variable to be insignificant in the consumption equation
for all regions (suggesting that the social transfer compensated  fully for the income loss due to
war disability). The efficient allocation would have ignored whether or not the household
received social subsidies. All other results were robust to including this variable.
The practice of cultivating swidden land increased the administrative allocation in the RR
and the MD, but not elsewhere. The positive effect in these regions can be interpreted as a
policy effort to discourage this form of land usage (on the assumption that lack of access to
regular crop land encouraged swidden farming.) The efficient allocation in the MD would also
have given weight to this characteristic, but considerably less so than the actual allocation.
When we tested an interaction term between allocated irrigated land equivalents and a
dummy for whether a household member worked for a cooperative, we found no sign of any
effect on consumption in the national or individual regional samples. However, in testing the
interaction with private land amounts, we find a significant positive effect of water surface land
on consumption in the national sample and in the Red River and Northern Uplands.  There was
also a significant negative interaction effect with private perennial land in the North Coast, and a
significant  negative interaction effect with non-irrigated private land in the Central Coast, though
at the same time there was a positive interaction with private irrigated land in that region. On
balance, our results suggest that having a cooperative job provided no advantage in deriving
benefits from a given land allocation, though there are signs of limited impact on the productivity
of other land types, notably water surface land in some regions.
In the aggregate sample, the proportion of good quality land (irrigated or not) had no
significant effect on either the actual or efficient allocation. This holds in all regions except NU
22and RR, where there is an indication that households with higher quality non-irrigated land
tended to get lower total land allocations. Other coefficients in both equations were little affected
by dropping these land quality variables (given possible endogeneity concerns).
7.  Welfare comparisons
The first panel of Table 4 gives various summary statistics on welfare outcomes for the
actual allocation, namely mean consumption and measures of inequality and poverty. The
inequality measure is the Theil index (E(0)), given by the difference between log mean
consumption per capita and the mean of log consumption per capita. The poverty measures are
the headcount index (% below the poverty line) and the squared poverty gap index (Foster et al.,
1984) which penalizes inequality among the poor. The poverty line is from Glewwe et al. (2000)
and aims to measure the cost of a set of basic food and non-food consumption needs. The
poverty line was developed on the same survey and agreed to by the government. The second
panel in Table 4 gives the same statistics for the consumption-efficient allocation, for which we
give mean consumption and inequality. The third panel is for an equal allocation, in which the
irrigated land equivalent is equalized on a per capita basis across all households within the
commune.
Recall that the socialist mode of agricultural production had been in place for a shorter
time in the South and that the Mekong Delta, in particular, had been far less collectivized than
the North and the Central Coast (though still subject to other controls under socialist
agriculture). 2 '  So the land allocation in the MD at the time of de-collectivization was
undoubtedly more influenced by the pre-Communist allocation, as determined by historical land
21  Recall  that the Central  Coast  was  probably  a somewhat  special  case  given  that it had been a war
zone and so collectivization  was more  easily  adopted  (Pingali  and Xuan 1992;  Ngo 1993).
23rights and prior land reforms (section 2). So it is notable that, relative to the consumption-
efficient allocation, we find that the actual allocation in the MD entailed a greater loss of
aggregate consumption, with a four percent consumption loss (Table 4). A seemingly plausible
explanation is that the historical (pre-unification) land allocation had become less efficient over
time but was nonetheless the more natural fall-back position in the MD. Ironically then, it can be
argued that the fact that socialist agriculture had been more short-lived in the South meant that
the region could not achieve the potential efficiency gains available to the North from land re-
allocation under de-collectivization. The history of Vietnam meant that the North was in a
somewhat better position to achieve a relatively efficient land allocation.
Both the efficient and "equal-land" allocations would have resulted in a lower poverty
rate than the actual allocation, though the differences are small (two percentage points overall).
This is somewhat deceptive since we found that the poverty line turns out to be close to the
intersection of the cumulative distribution functions. However, the poverty lines used here are
higher (in real terms) than the poverty lines used in Vietnam at the time of the 1988 allocations
(Dollar and Glewwe, 1998). So it can be argued that poverty incidence would have been higher
under the efficient allocation when assessed by the local standards of poverty at the time.
These observations are reinforced by Figure 1 which gives scatter plots of the percentage
losses from the actual relative to the consumption-maximizing allocation against actual
consumption, and a non-parametric regression function (using Cleveland's, 1979, local
regression method as programmed in STATA). It can be seen that the losses from the actual
allocation tend to rise with consumption, both nationally and within each region. Nationally,
mean consumption  gains are about 15% for the poorest, with losses of about 20% for the richest
(comparing end points on the regression function in Figure 1  (a)). The mean proportionate gains
24are roughly linear in log consumption. The point where the mean gain is zero is fairly close to
the poverty line (indicated by the vertical line). The gains to the poorest are also reflected in the
squared poverty gap measures in Table 4, which are higher for the consumption-efficient
allocation.
It is evident from Figure 1 that there are large differences between regions in the
conditional variance of the proportionate losses. In particular, the relationship between welfare
losses and consumption levels is less precise (though still positive) for the MD, where there are
clearly other factors at play in determining the incidence of the losses relative to the
consumption-efficient allocation. Again, historical (pre-unification) allocations are likely to have
had greater influence in this region.
An equal allocation of land (in terms of its irrigated equivalent) across all households
would have achieved a close approximation to the levels of mean consumption and inequality
observed in the data. There were of course deviations from equal land in practice, but the overall
outcomes for the distribution of consumption were similar. However, under the equal-land
allocation the poorest are generally better-off relative to the actual allocations as evidenced by
lower squared poverty gap indices. It is notable again that the region where the equal allocation
differed most from the actual is the Mekong Delta.
It might be conjectured that the market-based allocation would have achieved
substantially higher average consumption if only land could have been redistributed between
communes. To address this question, Table 5 repeats the simulations reported in Table 4 except
that we ignore commune boundaries when making the calculations. Thus the calculation entails
maximizing aggregate consumption over the entire region subject only to the aggregate amount
of (irrigation-equivalent) land in the region. In practice this would of course require moving
25households between communes, which was rare in Vietnam. However, this simulation gives an
idea of how much immobility constrains the problem.
The maximum levels of consumption would of course have been higher allowing
households to be moved between communes, so that only aggregate land endowments at the
regional level matter.  The difference is not large however (comparing Tables 4 and 5). The
actual allocation within communes, without redistribution between them, entailed losses in mean
consumption between one and nine percent as compared to a consumption maximizing land
allocation with redistribution allowed. Impacts on poverty also look similar. The headcount
index of poverty is lower everywhere but the Red River region, while the very poorest
households would have a worsening under the efficient allocation with mobility across
communes. When we compare the outcomes under the actual allocation with those resulting
from the equalization of land at the regional level, we find the losses in consumption to be
slightly lower-  ranging from one to eight percent. This scenario shows the largest impact on
poverty. Both the rate and the severity of poverty would be lower under a region-wide equal-
land allocation relative to the actual land allocation.
Again the Mekong Delta stands out as having high unrealized consumption gains from
land re-allocation. If mobility were possible within the region, the actual land allocation entails a
nine percent loss of aggregate consumption relative to the consumption maximizing allocation,
and eight percent relative to an equal allocation; in both cases this is about twice the overall
mean consumption loss (Table 5).  Lack of mobility under Communism appears to have come at
an unusually large cost in the MD. This is consistent with our casual observations that household
plot sizes vary greatly within the region.
268.  Conclusions
The heavy reliance on decentralized implementation of policy reforms in developing
countries has raised concerns about capture by local elites whose interests are not well served by
the center's aims. We have tried to see if such concerns are borne out by evidence on how land-
use rights were allocated in practice under the massive reform to land laws introduced by
Vietnam in 1988. This reform was arguably the most important step in the country's transition to
a market-based agricultural economy after abandoning collective farming. We have used a model
of household consumption to assess the distribution of consumption impacts relative to counter-
factual allocations, including the one that would have maximized aggregate consumption, wh-ich
would have been the competitive market allocation under our assumptions.
Our results are not consistent with the picture that many commentators have painted
(based on anecdotal evidence) of an inegalitarian land allocation stemming from the power of
relatively well-off local cadres to capture the process. In terms of the impact on average
consumption and consumption inequality, the observed allocation of land in our data was
roughly equivalent to giving every household in the commune the same irrigated-land
equivalent.
The observed allocation was significantly different to what one would have expected
from an efficient (consumption-maximizing) allocation, as would be achieved by a competitive
privatization at market-clearing prices.  The consumption-efficient allocation would have put
greater weight on education (which raised the marginal utility of land), and given less weight to
household size, labor force, minority-groups and male heads of household.  We find no evidence
that land allocation unduly favored households with government or semi-government jobs;
indeed, the market allocation would have given higher weight to these attributes, because such
27households would have put a higher value on.  land, presumably because of better access to other
farm inputs.
This decentralized reform achieved a more equitable assignment of land-use rights than
one would have expected from free markets, or some other arrangement for achieving a
consumption-efficient allocation. Our results are suggestive of an effort to protect the poorest
and reduce overall inequality, at the expense of aggregate consumption. The solution that was
arnved at entailed an equity-efficiency trade-off, indicating that both objectives were valued
positively by decision makers.
Combined with our reading of the history of Vietnam around this time, we can identify
two main reasons for the welfare outcomes implied by our results. The first factor was the
formation of a pro-reform coalition between peasants and reformers in the center. The latter were
fully aware of the risks of local capture that were intrinsic to a decentralized administrative
allocation of land and other farm inputs at the time of decollectivization. This is not to deny the
importance of the fact that the desire for reform was not just coming from the top, but reflected
more deeply-rooted  concerns about the inefficiency of collective agriculture among those who
were losing most, namely the peasants. The reforms followed many years of peasant resistance.
Nonetheless, the center was an active player. To help shift the balance of local power at the time
of reform, the center (for a limited time) actively promoted peasant organizations and used the
press to channel complaints and expose corruption.
The second reason is that initial conditions at the time of the reform appear to have been
favorable to achieving an equitable assignment of land-use rights at modest cost to total
consumption. Vietnam's low inequality in the initial distribution of education -stemming  from
social policies under communism - meant a smaller trade-off than would have been faced
28otherwise (assuming that it would have been the poor who had relatively less education without
those policies). The history of past, but not too far past, redistributive land reforms prior to the
introduction of socialist agriculture probably also helped in providing a relatively equitable
fallback position in deciding how land should be allocated at the time of de-collectivization.
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32Table 1: Variable definitions  and descriptive  statistics  __
Variable definitions  Northern Uplands  Red River  North Coast  Central Coast  Mekong Delta  Full sample
mean  st.dev.  mean  st.dev  mean  st.dev  mean  st. dev.  mean  st. dev.  mean  st. dev.
Log h'hold real consumption  expenditure
(dongs)  15.236  0.52  15.205  0.54  15.113  0.53  15.391  0.62  15.667  0.53  15.311  0.58
Real consumption  expenditure per capita
('000 dongs)  947.665  474.91  1114.444  506.65  899.983  391.30  1146.167  556.84  1422.439  847.95  1117.792  628.68
Religion: I if h'hold head is Buddhist or
Christian(Oifother,  animistornone)  0.333  0.47  0.264  0.44  0.180  0.38  0.116  0.32  0.564  0.50  0.313  0.46
Ethnic: 1 if h'hold head is of  ethnicity other
thanmajorityKinhorChinese  0.345  0.48  0.075  0.26  0.032  0.18  0.083  0.28  0.079  0.27  0.116  0.32
Local born: I if  head is born locally  0.798  0.40  0.947  0.22  0.893  0.31  0.849  0.36  0.831  0.38  0.859  0.35
Age of household  head  40.376  13.59  43.507  14.53  45.437  15.31  47.895  15.26  46.648  14.26  44.463  14.75
Gender of household head (male=1)  0.814  0.39  0.758  0.43  0.798  0.40  0.757  0.43  0.786  0.41  0.782  0.41
Log h'hold size excluding those < 6 yrs old  1.346  0.48  1.173  0.49  1.272  0.50  1.381  0.47  1.466  0.48  1.304  0.50
Dependency  ratio: 1- (ratio of labor  age
members to all members > 6 yrs old).  0.459  0.25  0.422  0.28  0.454  0.28  0.469  0.25  0.485  0.24  0.452  0.26
Labor age adult member  is handicapped  0.008  0.09  0.007  0.09  0.006  0.08  0.018  0.13  0  0  0.007  0.08
SOE:  h'hold member has primary or
secondary  occupation in State owned  0.006  0.08  0.032  0.19  0.012  0.11  0.007  0.08  0.011  0.11  0.019  0.14
enterprise and had it 5 years ago
Gov't job: member  has worked for gov't  in
primary/secondary  occupation for 5+ yrs, or  0.068  0.25  0.040  0.21  0.069  0.28  0.047  0.23  0.084  0.30  0.058  0.25
did so 5 yrs ago or retired from gov't
Social subsidy:  h'hold is recipient of gov't
tranfers to war heroes, martyrs, disabled etc  0.103  0.30  0.118  0.32  0.134  0.34  0.091  0.29  0.050  0.22  0.101  0.30
Household head's years of education  6.252  3.71  7.226  3.70  7.051  3.80  4.562  3.79  4.312  3.13  6.162  3.83
Other h'hold  adults' years of education  9.808  9.25  10.681  8.56  11.174  9.54  10.203  9.93  9.765  9.55  10.441  9.24
Log allocated irrigated land equivalent  (m 2)  7.197  0.73  7.447  0.62  7.400  0.79  7.603  0.73  8.416  1.29  7.587  0.93
Allocated irrigated  land equivalent  (m 2)  1679.569  1117.37  2007.701  997.03  2084.141  1312.36  2621.580  2403.59  7296.937  6514.12  3003.256  3646.40
H'hold's private irrigated land (in 2)  159.616  238.56  157.051  167.05  86.213  157.35  136.424  545.33  279.165  1505.35  155.887  648.13
H'hold's private non-irrigated land (M
2)  242.92  401.20  113.382  521.38  250.951  389.62  310.033  598.75  209.016  1561.83  218.544  921.38
H'hold's private  perennial land (m 2)  278.719  507.38  120.698  353.67  90.713  204.60  188.533  463.52  903.740  1672.80  343.747  1453.46
H'hold's private  water surface land (m 2)  58.320  163.23  60.732  176.88  30.012  116.36  0  0  116.259  1102.29  55.738  459.87
H'hold cultivates swidden land=1  0.289  0.45  0.037  0.19  0.043  0.20  0.225  0.42  0.020  0.14  0.104  0.31
Share of good irrigated land  0.281  0.391  0.563  0.371  0.439  0.344  0.319  0.405  0.246  0.413  0.428  0.400
Share of good non-irrigated land  0.376  0.422  0.729  0.404  0.815  0.327  0.369  0.414  0.942  0.213  0.663  0.429
H'holds in  regression sample  n-484  956  506  276  443  2810
Source: 1992/93 Viet Nam Living Standards Survey.  Note:  * We identify goverrunent  work through professional codes 20 and 21.Table 2: Determinants  of consumption
Northem  Red River  North Coast  Central Coast  Mekong Delta  Full sample
Uplands
religion  -0.086  -0.007  -0.041  0.124  -0.059  -0.022
(2.07)  (0.14)  (0.54)  (1.18)  (1.00)  (0.82)
ethnic  -0.062  -0.193  -0.117  -0.649  0.141  -0.070
(0.86)  (2.34)  (1.23)  (2.90)  (1.90)  (1.65)
local bom  -0.077  0.027  0.101  -0.138  -0.062  -0.035
(1.57)  (0.78)  (1.53)  (3.65)  (0.86)  (1.29)
age of  head  -0.0002  0.016  -0.003  0.002  0.005  0.007
(0.02)  (2.32)  (0.32)  (0.21)  (0.47)  (1.83)
age
2 of head x IO  0.038  -0.158  0.025  0.012  -0.046  -0.059
(0.42)  (2.19)  (0.33)  (0-15)  (0.45)  (1.46)
Log household size  0.451  0.462  0.534  0.532  0.452  0.482
(6.90)  (7.62)  (10.24)  (6.24)  (6.92)  (15.73)
dependency ratio  -0.066  -0.026  -0.120  -0.186  -0.110  -0.071
(0.65)  (0.41)  (1.71)  (1.73)  (1.19)  (2.00)
gender of head  0.074  0.030  0.014  0.025  -0.078  0.008
(1.65)  (0.75)  (0.37)  (0.61)  (1.34)  (0.34)
disabled adult  -0.348  0.003  -0.432  -0.067  --  -0.162
(3.81)  (0.01)  (1.37)  (0.61)  (1.68)
govemment j ob  0.103  0.149  0.103  0.296  0.181  0.140
(2.13)  (3.10)  (1.70)  (4.15)  (3.72)  (4.83)
SOE job  0.540  0.109  -0.044  0.498  0.046  0.130
(4.16)  (2.26)  (0.58)  (1.45)  (0.40)  (2.74)
education of head  0.021  0.027  0.024  0.033  0.009  0.025
(3.87)  (5.45)  (4.48)  (4.93)  (1.46)  (9.48)
educationofother  0.010  0.011  0.013  0.005  0.010  0.011
adults  (4.72)  (7.74)  (4.89)  (1.89)  (4.21)  (11.32)
social subsidy recipient  0.007  0.044  0.041  -0.034  -0.025  0.031
(0.17)  (1.10)  (0.56)  (0.52)  (0.30)  (1.15)
Log allocated irrigated  0.097  0.084  0.052  0.214  0.188  0.131
land equivalent  (2.82)  (2.30)  (2.39)  (3.81)  (6.89)  (7.45)
private irrigated x 103  0.137  0.239  0.236  0.049  0.017  0.028
(3.34)  (2.32)  (3.01)  (1.04)  (1.56)  (2.54)
private non-irrigated  0.015  -0.002  0.089  0.047  0.022  0.012
x IO,  (0.31)  (0.05)  (2.50)  (0.77)  (1.24)  (0.98)
private perennial x 103  0.064  0.109  0.038  0.033  0.042  0.019
(3.47)  (1.73)  (0.40)  (0.51)  (3.59)  (1.76)
private waterx10
3 0.189  0.175  0.313  --  0.016  0.040
(2.15)  (3.40)  (4.16)  (0.72)  (1.50)
cultivates swidden land  0.070  -0.082  -0.092  -0.018  0.112  -0.009
(1.15)  (0.86)  (0.70)  (0.26)  (3.83)  (0.24)
share good irrigated  0.017  0.032  0.084  -0.055  0.111  0.042
land  (0.25)  (0.57)  (1.21)  (0.63)  (1.55)  (1.47)
share good non-  -0.004  0.004  -0.008  -0.037  0.016  0.020
irrigated land  (0.06)  (0.10)  (0.27)  (0.54)  (0.20)  (0.81)
Constant  13.320  13.415  13.377  12.712  13.300  13.474
(41.53)  (49.55)  (50.75)  (28.17)  (37.69)  (68.80)
R2 0.679  0.671  0.703  0.666  0.570  0.673
RMSE  0.305  0.318  0.300  0.383  0.367  0.340
F stat  53.10  971.45  456.46  71.89  438.67  92.43
Prob>F  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000
n  484  956  506  276  443  2810
Note: The dependent variable is log household consumption expenditures. Commune fixed effects included. T-ratios in
parentheses are based on standard errors corrected for heteroskedasticity and clustering.
34Table 3: Actual land allocations compared to consumption-efficient  allocations
Northern  Uplands  Red River  North Coast  Central Coast  Mekong Delta  Full Sample
actual  efficient  actual  efficient  actual  efficient  actual  efficient  actual  efficient  actual  efficient
religion  -0.123  -0.095  0.047  -0.007  0.130  -0.043  0.035  0.157  0.162  -0.073  0.078  -0.025
(1.48)  (2.03)  (0.66)  (0.14)  (0.93)  (0.54)  (0.47)  (1.16)  (1.86)  (1.00)  (1.24)  (0.81)
ethnic  0.023  -0.068  0.309  -0.210  0.462  -0.124  -0.116  -0.826  0.364  0.174  0.013  -0.080
(0.39)  (0.85)  (2.56)  (2.29)  (2.78)  (1.22)  (0.47)  (2.73)  (1.51)  (1.91)  (0.11)  (1.65)
local born  0.032  -0.086  -0.029  0.030  -0.086  0.107  0.024  -0.176  0.146  -0.077  0.045  -0.040
(0.72)  (1.59)  (0.54)  (0.78)  (0.51)  (1.51)  (0.38)  (3.69)  (1.73)  (0.87)  (1.07)  (1.29)
age of head  -0.008  -0.0002  -0.0003  0.017  -0.012  -0.003  0.045  0.002  0.028  0.006  0.003  0.008
(0.49)  (0.00)  (0.81)  (2.29)  (0.88)  (0.32)  (2.23)  (0.22)  (1.75)  (0.47)  (0.46)  (1.82)
age 2 of headx  103 0.081  0.042  -0.065  -0.173  0.041  0.026  -0.486  0.016  -0.213  -0.057  -0.056  -0.068
(0.44)  (0.42)  (0.81)  (2.17)  (0.27)  (0.33)  (2.32)  (0.14)  (1.39)  (0.45)  (0.75)  (1.45)
log h'hold  size  0.724  0.499  0.794  0.504  0.696  0.563  0.661  0.676  0.243  0.557  0.695  0.555
(6.63)  (8.01)  (14.38)  (9.41)  (5.18)  (10.79)  (4.39)  (7.50)  (2.21)  (8.08)  (11.93)  (18.70)
dependency  ratio  -0.498  -0.073  -0.478  -0.029  -0.386  -0.127  -0.292  -0.237  0.092  -0.135  -0.420  -0.082
(2.59)  (0.66)  (6.91)  (0.41)  (2.52)  (1.71)  (1.34)  (1.68)  (0.50)  (1.21)  (6.07)  (2.02)
gender  ofhead  0.070  0.082  0.070  0.032  0.147  0.015  0.103  0.032  0.155  -0.096  0.094  0.009
(0.77)  (1.69)  (1.90)  (0.75)  (2.43)  (0.37)  (1.19)  (1.68)  (1.21)  (1.34)  (2.82)  (0.35)
disabled  adult  -0.125  -0.385  -0.086  0.003  -0.094  -0.456  0.118  -0.085  -0.053  -0.186
(1.19)  (3.81)  (0.70)  (0.00)  (0.45)  (1.36)  (0.57)  (0.61)  (0.64)  (1.68)
gov'tjob  -0.221  0.114  -0.122  0.162  -0.200  0.109  -0.049  0.377  0.095  0.223  -0.160  0.161
(1.28)  (2.17)  (1.90)  (2.93)  (1.63)  (1.71)  (0.29)  (3.48)  (0.92)  (3.74)  (2.75)  (4.77)
SOE  -0.767  0.598  -0.232  0.119  0.134  -0.046  -0.049  0.634  0.342  0.056  -0.174  0.150
(2.26)  (3.90)  (4.09)  (2.22)  (0.43)  (0.57)  (0.13)  (1.35)  (0.88)  (0.40)  (2.32)  (2.69)
education  of head  -0.012  0.024  -0.006  0.029  -0.009  0.026  -0.018  0.042  0.018  0.011  -0.001  0.028
(1.06)  (3.81)  (1.10)  (5.26)  (1.10)  (4.38)  (2.53)  (4.35)  (1.46)  (1.45)  (0.30)  (9.12)
education  of other  -0.005  0.011  0.002  0.012  0.005  0.014  0.004  0.007  0.010  0.012  0.003  0.013
adults  (1.31)  (4.81)  (0.74)  (6.95)  (0.86)  (5.04)  (0.84)  (1.87)  (1.45)  (4.09)  (1.29)  (11.04)
social subsidy  0.005  0.008  -0.079  0.048  0.035  0.044  -0.192  -0.044  -0.371  -0.030  -0.088  0.036
recipient  (0.07)  (0.17)  (1.61)  (1.09)  (0.37)  (0.57)  (1.58)  (0.52)  (3.50)  (0.30)  (2.26)  (1.15)
private irrigated  0.471  0.152  0.399  0.261  0.084  0.249  0.144  0.063  0.028  0.021  0.151  0.033
X  103  (2.79)  (3.41)  (3.28)  (2.28)  (0.71)  (2.95)  (5.79)  (1.07)  (2.05)  (1.55)  (3.14)  (2.54)
private  non irrigated  -0.033  0.017  -0.013  -0.003  0.174  0.093  -0.086  0.059  -0.004  0.027  -0.012  0.014
x  lo0  (0.66)  (0.30)  (0.21)  (0.00)  (1.62)  (2.49)  (1.85)  (0.78)  (0.16)  (1.24)  (0.69)  (0.97)
privateperennial  0.015  0.071  0.028  0.119  0.054  0.040  -0.084  0.042  0.022  0.052  0.005  0.022
X  103  (0.27)  (3.59)  (0.62)  (1.68)  (0.38)  (0.40)  (2.32)  (0.50)  (0.62)  (3.63)  (0.57)  (1.76)
private  water x  10
3 -0.017  0.209  0.041  0.192  0.346  0.330  --  --  0.058  0.020  0.063  0.046
(0.11)  (2.17)  (0  .7)  () (2.  (2.62)  (4.42)  (6.50)  (0.71)  (5.00)  (1.50)
35cultivates swidden  0.121  0.077  0.230  -0.089  0.050  -0.097  0.046  -0.023  0.465  0.138  0.078  -0.010
land  (1.10)  (1.26)  (2.32)  (0.87)  (0.40)  (0.69)  (0.40)  (0.26)  (7.90)  (4.08)  (0.93)  (0.24)
share of good  0.302  -0.005  -0.032  0.035  -0.100  0.089  0.050  -0.070  0.051  0.136  0.013  0.048
irrigated land  (1.20)  (0.00)  (0.74)  (0.57)  (0.78)  (1.20)  (0.52)  (0.62)  (0.48)  (1.57)  (0.18)  (1.48)
share of good  non-  -0.434  0.019  -0.201  0.004  0.029  -0.008  0.221  -0.047  -0.019  0.020  -0.035  0.023
irrigated  land  (2.89)  (0.24)  (3.46)  (0.10)  (0.44)  (0.26)  (3.30)  (0.53)  (0.38)  (0.04)  (0.89)  (0.81)
Constant  5.729  6.881  --  4.778  --  6.614  --  7.003  --  5.876  --
(18.39)  (38.40)  (12.97)  (15.73)  (17.44)  (13.74)
R2 0.543  0.630  0.627  0.610  0.771  0.675
RMSE  0.512  0.389  0.503  0.482  0.648  0.545
F  stat  (14, 15)=  (20,31)-  (16,17)=  (10,11)=  (18,22)=  (21,109)
135.92  2020.27  2120.20  230.57  1066.59  =874.10
Prob>F  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000
obs  484  484  956  956  506  506  276  276  443  443  2810  2810
Note: Cormmune  fixed  effects included.  T-ratios in parentheses  are based on standard  errors corrected for heteroskedasticity  and clustering.
36Table 4: Mean consumption,  inequality and poverty under alternative land allocations
Northern  Red River  North Coast  Central Coast  Mekong Delta  Full Sample
Uplands
Actual allocation
Mean consumption  ('000 dongs)/  h'hold  4725.083  4594.556  4183.381  5725.078  7300.921  5258.276
Inequality  in per capita expenditures  0.101  0.085  0.079  0.124  0.130  0.115
Headcount index of poverty (%)  81.322  67.523  85.143  61.975  49.919  68.455
Squared  poverty  gap index (xO00)  13.014  7.386  13.464  9.719  5.639  9.271
Consumption-efficient  counterfactual
Maximum  consumption  4821.796  4656.408  4227.616  6000.305  7688.655  5448.437
('000 dongs)/ h'hold
(%) loss (1-actual/efficient)  2.006  1.328  1.046  4.587  5.043  3.490
Inequality  of consumption  under the  0.120  0.101  0.087  0.185  0.176  0.150
efficient land allocation
Headcount index of poverty  under the  78.393  66.691  83.959  59.664  50.526  66.331
efficient land allocation (%)
Squared poverty  gap index under the  13.564  8.083  13.712  11.976  6.724  10.330
efficient land allocation (xlO0)
Equal land counterfactual
Mean consumption  at equal land per  4773.223  4620.384  4205.749  5829.239  7546.890  5345.507
household
(%) loss  1.009  0.559  0.532  1.787  3.259  1.632
Inequality  of consumption  at equal land  0.101  0.087  0.080  0.122  0.117  0.116
allocation
Headcount index of poverty at equal  79.620  66.985  84.653  61.134  46.440  66.505
land allocation (%)
Squared poverty  gap index at equal  12.700  7.411  13.331  9.167  4.548  8.928
land allocation (xl 00)
Note: Inequality  is given by the difference  between log mean consumption  per capita and the mean of log consumption  per capita.
37Table 5: Mean consumption,  inequality and poverty with mobility  between communes
Northern  Red River  North Coast  Central Coast  Mekong Delta  Full sample
Uplands
Consumption-efficient  counter  factual
Maximum  consumption
('000 dongs)/ h'hold  4836.772  4674.562  4245.877  6111.004  8386.244  5580.237
(%) loss  2.309  1.712  1.472  6.315  12.942  5.770
Inequality  under the efficient
allocation  0.117  0.101  0.088  0.186  0.223  0.146
Headcount index of poverty  78.195  66.422  82.898  59.174  49.555  64.562
under the efficient allocation (%)
Squaredpovertygapindexunder  13.271  8.029  13.605  11.551  6.526  9.457
the efficient allocation  (xlOO)
Equal land counter  factual
Mean consumption  at equal land
per household  4792.570  4639.757  4226.545  5938.658  8105.723  5488.358
(%) loss  1.408  0.974  1.021  3.596  9.929  4.192
Inequality  at equal land  0. 098  0.087  0.080  0.122  0.149  0.113
Headcount index of poverty  at  79.185  67.107  83.755  60.294  46.804  65.004
equal land allocation (%)
Squared poverty gap index at
equal land allocation (xlOO)  12.419  7.345  13.218  8.724  4.282  8.076
38Appendix: Reduced form regressions  for consumption
Northern  Red River  North Coast  Central Coast  Mekong Delta  Full Samrle
Uplands
religion  -0.098  -0.003  -0.034  0.131  -0.02  -0.005
(1.96)  (0.06)  (0.56)  (1.60)  (0.62)  (0.25)
ethnic  -0.059  -0.167  -0.093  -0.674  0.210  -0.086
(1.14)  (1.84)  (0.71)  (2.40)  (2.15)  (2.39)
local born  -0.074  0.025  0.097  -0.133  -0.035  -0.024
(1.55)  (0.49)  (1.47)  (1.64)  (0.62)  (1.02)
age of head  -0.001  0.016  -0.003  0.012  0.010  0.008
(0.11)  (2.56)  (0.40)  (1.03)  (1.02)  (2.15)
age 2 of head  x  0.046  -0.163  0.027  -0.092  -0.086  -0.065
103  (0.45)  (2.46)  (0.34)  (0.82)  (0.88)  (1.77)
log hhold  0.521  0.529  0.570  0.673  0.498  0.573
size  (8.58)  (12.56)  (10.92)  (7.93)  (8.02)  (23.64)
dependency  -0.114  -0.067  -0.140  -0.249  -0.092  -0.128
ratio  (1.31)  (1.22)  (1.94)  (1.89)  (0.91)  (3.61  h
gender of  0.081  0.036  0.022  0.047  -0.049  0.018
head  (1.86)  (1.19)  (0.54)  (0.67)  (0.90)  (0.94 F
disabled adult  -0.360  -0.005  -0.437  -0.042  --  -0.17
(2.20)  (0.04)  (2.43)  (0.22)  (2.08)
gov't job  0.081  0.138  0.093  0.286  0.199  0.118
(1.34)  (2.66)  (1.83)  (2.58)  (3.03)  (4.25j
SOEjob  0.466  0.090  -0.037  0.488  0.110  0.107
(2.43)  (1.60)  (0.28)  (1.66)  (0.61)  (2.23)
education of  0.020  0.026  0.024  0.029  0.013  0.025
head  (3.77)  (6.50)  (5.04)  (3.28)  (1.69)  (10.25)
education of  0.010  0.011  0.013  0.006  0.012  0.011
other adults  (4.32)  (6.35)  (6.21)  (1.64)  (4.16)  (10.87)
social subsidy  0.008  0.037  0.043  -0.075  -0.095  0.018
recipient  (0.15)  (0.98)  (0.90)  (0.84)  (1.00)  (0.71)
private  0.183  0.272  0.241  0.080  0.022  0.067
irrigated x 10
3 (2.46)  (3.00)  (2.22)  (1.48)  (1.33)  (5.83)
private non  0.012  -0.004  0.098  0.028  0.021  0.011
irrigated x Io,  (0.27)  (0.13)  (2.02)  (0.56)  (1.32)  (1.25)
private  0.066  0.112  0.041  0.015  0.046  0.020
perennial x 10
3 (1.75)  (2.59)  (0.53)  (0.24)  (3.77)  (3.66)
private water  x  0.187  0.179  0.331  --  0.027  0.048
*103  (2.01)  (2.79)  (2.54)  (1.53)  (3.26)
cultivates  0.082  -0.063  -0.089  -0.008  0.199  -0.010
swidden land  (1.77)  (0.88)  (0.83)  (0.09)  (1.23)  (0.31)
Share of good  0.025  0.015  0.079  -0.044  0.120  0.054
irrigated land  (0.38)  (0.32)  (1.47)  (0.59)  (1.38)  (2.02)
Share of good  -0.025  0.001  -0.006  0.011  0.012  0.016
non-irrigated  (0.47)  (0.04)  (0.17)  (0.14)  (0.20)  (0.78)
land
constant  13.874  --  --  14.128  14.619  13.879
(71.90)  (46.60)  (47.99)  (137.88)
R  2  0.670  0.668  0.700  0.641  0.522  0.657
RMSE  0.309  0.320  0.301  0.397  0.387  0.349
F stat  25.220  40785.07  32665.58  14.003  10.360  39.568
Prob>F  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000
N  484  956  506  276  443  2810
test of  F(36,894)  F(53,1804)  F(39,932)  F(31,486)  F(42,796)  F(129,5340)
y/(  - f)=  b  =8.68  = 179.15  = 151.65  =6.66  =31.45  =28.37
Prob:>F  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000
Note: The dependent variable is log household consumption expenditure. Commune fixed effects were also included.
39Figure 1: Distribution of consumption losses relative to the efficient allocation
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